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Article 9

sician, psychiatrist, and chaplain
alike. By eliminating these artificial conceptual boundaries, all of
us can help lead medicine, psychiatry and religion to a holistic
and unified appreciation of life,

living, and humanity, perhaps the
greatest mysteries, and ones we
share equally with our patients.
In fact, a better appreciation of
our own unity may prove to be
the key to comprehensive medical
care.
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Even if it be granted that the
unborn child does not possess life,
but only potential life-the absurd thesis of Justice Blackmun,
in Roe v. Wade, January 22, 1973
-no justification for an abortion
is established either morally or
legally. Granted that this unacceptable position did actually
maintain in reality, it could only
signify that the actual life of the
born child would be derived from
the potential life of the unborn
child. A potential human being
would be virtually a human being.
It would have a vital principle to
become human. Now the closest
thing in dignity to any nature is
found in the principle of that nature. If one destroys the dignity
of the principle, how does one restore the diginity of the nature?
Among the reasons presented
for a basis of decision, the Court
maintained that "the unborn have
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never been recognized in the law
as persons in the whole sense."
But the notion of person can only
be understood as indivisible. What
the Court wished to convey is
that the rights of the unborn have
not been consistently treated in
civil and criminal suits. It would
have been incumbent upon the
Court, in arriving at so weighty a
decision, to explore whether the
unborn child could at least enjoy
the status of a moral person. But
this door they dared not open
because a moral person has the
right to perpetuate itself. Justice
Blackmun's elaborate historical,
legal, and moral maze of fact and
fancy was designed to leave no
avenue of escape in this direction.
A more tenable position is that
t he human intellectual principle
establishes the human person.
This principle is at first only in
potency to knowledge, both before birth and immediately after
birth. Now, how do we establish
t he origin of this principle in
man?
Too often, of late, the man of
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faith is apt to declare apodictically that this intellectual principle
is established at conception, when
an immediate animation takes
place.
There are no sound theological
reasons for accepting such a theory. First of all, there has never
been any official ecclesiastical
document, encyclical, decree or
canon, which endorses this theory
because "the soul is not transmitted with the semen as though it
were begotten by coitus."l In
Pius IX's
definition of the ImI
maculate Conception, there is the
affirmation of faith that "in the
very first instant of her conception she was preserved from all
stain of original sin." Original sin
is transmitted throughout the
union of seminal principles, which
are ordered to the development,
organization and growth of the
body. This human body becomes
a human being with the infusion
of the soul, the creative act of
God. The seminal principles neither virtually nor potentially contain the souJ.2 But the body is in
potency to receive the soul. To a
Thomist, this reception takes
place when the body is developed
to the point of being a fitting subject of the intellectual soul. If one
maintains that the soul is present
at the moment of conception, then
he must justify how this one cell
is a human being. DNA does not
suffice to constitute a total human being. But "nature is wanting in nothing that is necessary
for the fulfillment of its proper
operation."3 This cell, whose activity is immediately directed to
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the embryonic order, does not
have any intrinsic exigency for
an intellectual principle. But
when we witness the configuration of a human being in fetal
development, and we recognize it
to be human, then there is the
exigency for an intellectual principle for it to be truly human.
Traditionally, the only person
who was actually conceived as a
person in the womb was Christ.
An immediate animation theory arise as a simple solution to
the problem that abortion is not
permitted even from the moment
of conception. But to say that the
soul should be considered as present at the moment of conception
is not a declaration that the soul
is actually present. It is another
way of saying that the newly
formed cell possesses a right to
survival in virtue of its dignity as
a principle in human generation,
which is terminated with the infusion of the intellectual soul. It
is indeed a moral person. But to
declare it a natural human person, a man, is not as convincing
as the theory of an Aristotle or a
Thomas, who never lost sight of
common sense in their quest for
wisdom.
Professor John T. Noonan, Jr.
makes an overt case for immediate ensoulment at the moment of
conception, with arguments which
do not solve anything. "If a moment had to be chosen for ensoulment, no convincing argument
now appeared to support Aristotle
or to put ensoulment at a later
stage of fetal life."4 To quote another view of Noonan that lends
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itself to instant animation, "A being with a human genetic code is
man." .' A genetic code is a biological fact, an hereditary factor.
While it is true to say that the
matrix of the adult's personality
is genetically present at the moment of conception, this cannot
be accepted in a deterministic
sense. This only refers to man's
bodily dispositions. The human
person is at once organic and
transorganic, with a destiny which
is temporal and eternal. The determining principles of man's personality are nongenetic, his intellect and will. Although intimately
influenced by genetic qualities,
the will is not determined by
them and "the intellectual soul
does not operate through any
bodily organ ."6
To Thomas, the person cannot
be defined in terms of the body
alone, or the soul alone, but they
are both inextricably associated
with the notion of the human person; and human nature is generated at the moment of ensoulment. (That is why he does not
allow the separated soul to be
called a person; and he advances
the exigency of the final resurrection of the body so that the separated soul will be reunited to the
body to become a person in eternity.) Man, standing on the horizon of eternity, is not only
dignified through his soul, but his
body also possess a dignity as the
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noblest matter in all creation,
from the moment of conception,
in virtue of its potency to receive
the intellectual soul as its very
act of existing. This is the foundation of its natural right to survival. Man is co-creator of man,
and what is conceived excels in
nature many legal creations of
society, moral persons, and it deserves the same title at least.
By way of a postscript, it should
be noted that the position of the
Angelic Doctor with respect to
the time of ensoulment (a matter of faith and the precise moment of which reason cannot place
with certitude), has been unduly
prejudiced because of his errol'
on the Immaculate Conception.
Thomas taught that Mary was
immaculate from the moment of
ensoulment, and not from the moment of conception. The doctrine
of the Immaculate Conception
recognizes the distinction between
conception and ensoulment, and
declares that it was from the moment of conception that Mary
was immaculate.
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